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Ring Around the Grand Jury:
Informing Grand Jurors of the Capital
Consequences of Aggravating Facts
K. Brent Tomer*
U.S. Attorney: "[The grand jurors] are not explicitly advised that the impact of
their decision is to subject the defendant to a death penalty."




Judge: "Any advice at all about the maximum penalty that a return of the draft
indictment would entail?"
U.S. Attorny: "No . . . they have been told from time immemorial that
punishment is not their concern. What is their concern is the finding of facts."'
L Introduction
The federal system places the decision to subject a person to a trial on a
capital charge in the hands of sixteen to twenty-three citizens.2 Yet, as the above
excerpt from the oral argument in United States v. Allen3 illustrates, the grand jury
is uninformed regarding punishment.4 It is simply unaware that a "true bill" will
jeopardize the life of the indicted.'
* J.D. Candidate, May 2005, Washington and Lee University School of Law; B.F.A.,
Otterbein College,June 1999. The author would like to thank Professors Roger Groot and David
Bruck for their guidance and support. The author would also like to thank the members of the
Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse, especially Todd Egland, Meghan Morgan, Maxwell Smith, and
Jessie Seiden, for their editorial guidance and "putting up" with me. Finally, I am indebted to my
family, without whom I would not have achieved anything.
1. Respondent's January 17,2003 Oral Argument at 32:00, United States v. Allen, 357 F.3d
745 (8th Cir. 2004), reharing en bancgranted by, vacated by 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 9190 (8th Cir. May
11, 2004), at http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/oralargs/oaFrame.html.
2. FED. R C iM. P. 6(a)(1).
3. 357 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 2004).
4. See Respondent'sj anuary 17, 2004 Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 32:00 (stating that the
grand jury was unaware of the possible punishment).
5. Id
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The constitutional implications of blind grand jury deliberations on capital
offenses are considerable. Moreover, in addition to the emotional effect of
standing trial for one's life, a capital indictment has a profound effect on trial
procedure and expense.6 It subjects a defendant to a punishment-qualified petit
jury and to an extended bifurcated trial.7 Capital defense counsel must spend
much time and expense investigating the defendant's history, background, and
mental condition in order to defend against aggravating factors such as future
dangerousness, and to uncover mitigating circumstances that may warrant a
sentence less than death.' With this in mind, it appears logical that the decision
to charge a capital offense should only be made after careful deliberation by a
body of citizens acting independently of both prosecutor and judge.
The federal courts are now in a position to address this problem and to
reinvigorate the grand jury's role in the charging process. In 2002 the United
States Supreme Court ruled in Ring v. Arizona9 that Arizona's capital sentencing
scheme was unconstitutional because it allowed a judge, rather than a jury, to
determine the existence of aggravating factors. ° The statutory aggravating
factors demarcated the line between life and death, and as such, the Court
concluded, were to be treated as elements of an aggravated offense of capital
murder." The same holds true in the federal system.12 Without a finding from
the jury that a defendant committed a capital-eligible offense with, for example,
the expectation of pecuniary gain or in a heinous, depraved, or cruel manner, a
federal defendant cannot be sentenced to death. 3
Ring was premised on the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial." However,
that decision represented an application of the mandate ofApprendi v. New Jersey'5
that under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
"'any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for
a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven
6. For a thorough analysis of the costs of capital defense representation, see generally
SUBCOMM. ON FED. DEATH PENALTY CASESJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U. S, FED. DEATH
PENALTY CASES: RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE COST AND QUALITY OF DEFENSE
REPRESENTATION (1998), at www.uscourts.gov/dpenalty/4REPORT.htm#decision.
7. Id. at I.B.1.
8. SeeWiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,522 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
396 (2000)) (stating that capital defense counsel have an " 'obligation to conduct a thorough
investigation of the defendant's background' ").
9. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
10. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 (2002).
11. Id. at 592.
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (2000) ("Mitigating and aggravating factors to be considered in
determining whether a sentence of death is justified.").
13. Id.
14. Ring, 536 U.S. at 588.
15. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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beyond a reasonable doubt.'6 Indeed, although the Supreme Court has yet to
explicitly rule that in federal cases the Fifth Amendment requires statutory
aggravating factors to be submitted to the grand jury, there is little doubt that
Ring requires this result.'" At the time of this writing, at least three federal
circuits have already ruled that the Indictment Clause requires that capital
indictments contain statutory aggravating factors."8 Furthermore, United States
Department of Justice policy now directs all federal prosecutors to submit
statutory aggravating factors to the grand jury.' 9
A grand jury determination of aggravating facts is a necessary and
constitutionally required step for prosecutors seeking the death penalty. But the
requirement lacks force unless the grand jurors are informed of the capital
consequences of their charging decisions.' This article explains why the
Constitution mandates that federal grand juries must be informed that
aggravating factors demarcate the line between a capital and noncapital charge.
Part II will focus on the historical function of the grand jury and will
demonstrate that because the framers felt so strongly about the "informed"
grand jury, they included the right as part of the Fifth Amendment. Part III will
describe the current state of Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence in order
to show how the informed grand jury comports with current doctrine. Part IV
16. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 243 (1999)); see U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .. "); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. "); Ring, 536 U.S. at
608 (basing the Court's decision on the strictures of Apprendk). Although stated in the language of
due process, it is quite settled that the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not apply
to the states. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884). The quoted language from Jones
probably referred to the requirement that all elements of an offense must be contained in the
charging document under the Notice Clause of the Sixth Amendment, incorporated in the Four-
teenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right... to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation .... "); Cole v. Arkansas, 333
U.S. 196,201 (1948).
17. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625,627 (2002) (ruling in a non-capital federal case
that the Apprendi rule applies to Indictment Clause challenges).
18. See United States v. Robinson, 367 F.3d 278,284 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Ring's Sixth Amend-
ment holding applies with equal force in the context of a Fifth Amendment Indictment Clause
challenge, even though the Supreme Court has yet to hold as much in a capital case."); United States
v. Allen, 357 F.3d 745, 748 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that "aggravating factors essential to qualify a
particular defendant as death eligible... must be alleged in the indictment"); United States v. Higgs,
353 F.3d 281, 297 (4th Cir. 2003) ("[Imhe principles of Apprendi and Ring dictate that any factor
required to be submitted to the jury must be included in the indictment.").
19. See Memorandum from James Comey, Deputy Attorney General, to all federal prosecu-
tors, at 3 (July 2, 2004) (on file with author) (stating that prosecutors should immediately begin
including in indictments all statutory aggravating factors).
20. See infra Part IV (discussing the inadequacy of a grand jury determination of aggravating
facts without the knowledge of the punishment consequences of its decision).
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1
will argue that the modem grand jury has been severed from both its original
function and the Supreme Court's interpretation of its duties. Part V will
describe the benefits an informed grand jury can provide for the problematic
area of prosecutorial discretion in capital charging decisions. Finally, this article
will close with a short section on the applicability of the informed grand jury to
state proceedings.
II. The Historical Function
The grand jury began its rich, if sometimes sordid, history in 1166 with the
Assize of Clarendon.2 ' King Henry II of England's decree provided "for a body
of twelve men in each county" to report to the King persons "who were
suspected of crimes."2' These panels were not formed for the function
purportedly served by the modern grand jury.23 Instead of protecting the
innocent from arbitrary abuses of power, the early grand juries were summoned
for the sole purpose of increasing the King's power over the Church.24 These
early grand juries, however, were not empaneled under the guidance of the courts
or the Crown.2 The members proceeded solely on the basis of their own
knowledge of what had occurred in the community.26 Because the panel
operated with complete independence, at least insofar as it had the power to
bring its own accusations, and under strict secrecy, the grand jury developed into
a feared and powerful institution. 27 Thus, the institution began as a body of men
free from the constraints of the law.'
21. RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL 1 (1963).
22. In re Russo, 53 F.RD. 564, 568 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
23. See LEROY D. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY 7 (1975) (stating that the purposes of the first
grand juries must be separated from its modern characteristics).
24. Id Prior to the decree, persons charged with most crimes (including murder) would,
most often, be referred to the ecclesiastical courts, and any levied fine would be forfeited to the
Church. Id at 8. With the Assize, the King captured judicial control over the common criminal
process. Id. An indictment was tantamount to a conviction because the charged individual usually
faced trial by ordeal, which could consist of, among other atrocities, the boiling of appendages. Id
at 9. For a more thorough discussion of early trial practices, see MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P.
NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 6-9 (1977).
25. SUZAN W. BRENNER & GREGORY G. LOCKHART, FEDERAL GRAND JURY PRACTICE
2.1, at 5 (1996).
26. CLARK, supra note 23, at 9. The members could, however, face consequences for failing
to return a "true bill" for those the King sought to punish. Id
27. Russo, 53 F.R.D. at 568; CLARK, supra note 23, at 9.
28. See Ric Simmons, Re-examining the GrandJury: Is there Room for Democray in the Criminal
Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (2002) (describing how the early grand juries would hear no
evidence and would often bring indictments against those who were not guilty).
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In time, the functions and format of the grand jury changed.- It was not
until the seventeenth century, however, that the grand jury began to be perceived
as a shield against malicious prosecutions.3" In 1681 two London grand juries
refused to indict Stephen Colledge and the Earl of Shaftesbury for high treason.3
The famous pair represented the chief Protestant opposition to Charles II's
efforts to restore the Catholic Church in England.3 2 After the grand jury failed
to indict Colledge, the King sought a new indictment in a district more
sympathetic to his politics.33 The second grand jury returned an indictment
against Colledge that led to his execution.' The King then moved against
Shaftesbury.35 During consideration of the indictment, the prosecutor sought
to hold the proceedings in public.36 The predominantly Protestant grand jury
members, arguing that an open proceeding would subject their decisions to
undue influence, objected.37 The chief justice, nevertheless, acquiesced to the
prosecutor's request.38 The panel members, however, did not respond as kindly
to the prosecutor's demands: they refused to indict.39 Shaftesbury, fearing the
same fate as Colledge, fled the country.'
This defiant act was looked upon by the people of England as a
confirmation of their legal rights and prompted Sir John Somers, a close friend
of Shaftesbury, to write his famous manuscript describing the importance of the
grand jury as a bulwark against malicious prosecutions.4 The political and legal
atmosphere surrounding these proceedings, however, reveals an important flaw
in the public perception. The Protestant grand jurors who failed to return
indictments against Colledge and Shaftesbury obviously were sympathetic to the
pair's cause. Given the broad interpretations of treason by the Crown, the pair
29. See BRENNER & LOCKHART, supra note 25, § 2.1, at 5 (describing the abolishment of the
trial by ordeal and the establishment of the petit jury).
30. FRANKEL & NAFTALIS, spra note 24, at 9.
31. Id. at 10.
32. CLARK, supra note 23, at 9.
33. Id. at 10.
34. Id.
35. Id.





40. Id at 719.
41. See GILBERT BURNET, HISTORY OF MY OWNTIME: VOLUME II, 882 (London, London
Bookfellows 1725) (1724) (describing how SirJohn Somers's manuscript impacted the atmosphere
of the time). See general# JOHN SOMERS, THE SECURITY OF ENGLISH-MENS LIvES (London, T.
Mitchel 1681) (praising the grand jury as an important protection against malicious prosecutions).
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probably was legally guilty.4 2 Instead of defining the grand jury's role as a
protector of the innocent, as is widely believed, these grand juries actually
engaged in a form of grand jury nullification.43 They passed judgment on the.
wisdom of the law itself.' Thus, the grand jury settled into its true historical
role-arguably its role since its inception-as the conscience of the community
in which it sits.4 5
The American colonists did not overlook this role of the grand jury as
guardian of the community.' The popularity of Lord Somers's manuscript
reached its zenith in the colonies, and the grand jury became one of the early
forums for revolt.47 In perhaps the most famous example from colonial times,
at least two successive grand juries refused to indict John Peter Zenger in 1743
for seditious libel against the Royal Governor of New York.48 Perhaps the
Governor believed that the grand jury proceedings would frighten Zenger into
submission, regardless of the legal truth of the charges.49 More likely, though,
Zenger had indeed violated the broad definition of libel, for truth could not be
claimed as a defense.50 In 1765 grand juries refused to indict the leaders of the
Stamp Act riots.5 ' In 1768 a grand jury refused to find a "true bill" against the
editors of the Boston Gazette despite ChiefJustice Thomas Hutchinson's assertion
that the grand jurors would be damned if they did not.12 Hutchinson quickly
realized the futility of submitting unpopular indictments to Massachusetts grand
juries.5 3 Later that year, Hutchinson declined to seek indictments against the
colonists responsible for the riots surrounding the seizure of John Hancock's
sloop Liberty.
42. Schwartz, spra note 36, at 716-17.
43. Simmons, supra note 28, at 10.
44. Id
45. See id. at 2-10 (describing the subtle functions of the historical grand jury in addition to
finding probable cause).
46. YOUNGER, supra note 21, at 22.
47. Id. at 21.
48. See SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE 1-14 (2d ed. 1997)
(reporting three successive failures to indict Zenger followed by prosecution by information);
CLARK, supra note 23, at 18 (reporting two); FRANKEL & NAFTALIS, supra note 24, at 11 (reporting
two failures followed by prosecution through information in which the jury returned a not guilty
verdict).
49. CLARK, supra note 23, at 18.
50. Id; Simmons, supra note 28, at 11 n.47.
51. YOUNGER, supra note 21, at 28.
52. Id
53. Id at 28-29.
54. Id; see also DIRK HOERDER, CROWD ACTION IN REVOLUTIONARY MASSACI-IUSETTS
1765-1780, at 164-70 (1977) (describing the Liberty riots and aftermath in detail).
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After 1776 all of the newly drafted state constitutions, except for New
Jersey's, either included an express right to a grand jury indictment or language
that was widely interpreted as such, and every state enacted statutes that secured
the right.5 When the newly drafted federal Constitution was submitted to the
states without a grand jury provision, several of the states objected.1
6
Massachusetts led the call for amendments, partly due to the efforts of John
Hancock, who was no doubt affected by his experience with the Libert riots.57
On December 15, 1791, the Grand Jury Clause was ratified as part of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 8 It reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when
actual service in time of War or public danger.
59
In this way the right of a grand jury indictment was secured, not simply as a
means to determine probable cause, but as the bulwark of local custom.6° The
grand jury of the United States Constitution was created to secure a voice for the
local community in which it sits: a voice with not enough force to be heard in
Congress.6 1
Nearly a century later, in 1881, the Supreme Court ruled that a state's use
of an information, rather than a grand jury indictment, did not offend the Due
Process Clause of the newly-ratified Fourteenth Amendment.6 2 Nonetheless, the
Court remained reverent of the grand jury as a federal constitutional right.63 In
Exparte Bain,' decided only three years after Hurtado, the Court granted a writ
of habeas corpus because the indictment in that case had been amended by the
55. BEALE ETAL., supra note 48, at 1-17; YOUNGER, supra note 21, at 37.
56. BEALE ET AL., supra note 48, at 1-18.
57. Id.; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1 5.2(g) (3d ed. 2000)
(stating that the "authority of the grand jury to 'nullify' the law arguably was the most important
attribute of grand jury review from the perspective of those who insisted that a grand jury clause
be induded in the Bill of Rights").
58. BEALE ET AL., supra note 48, at 1-19.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
60. See Simmons, supra note 28, at 13 (describing the political, rather than legal rationale for
the Fifth Amendment, notwithstanding its stated legal purpose).
61. See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 367 F.3d 896, 902 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) ("An independent grand jury-one that interposes the local community's values on
prosecutorial decisions that are controlled by policies set in Washington as to the enforcement of
laws passed in Washington-seems like an important safeguard that is entirely consistent with the
grand jury's traditional function'.
62. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
63. See, e.g., Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 13 (1887) (praising the value of the grand jury).
64. 121 U.S. 1 (1887).
2004]
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trial court rather than a grand jury.65 In holding that the amended indictment
deprived the trial court of the ability to try the defendant, the Court stated that
even though there is no longer the danger of executive oppression, "it remains
true that the grand jury is as valuable as ever in securing... 'individual citizens
from an open and public accusation of crime, and from the trouble, expense, and
anxiety of a public trial before a probable cause is established by the presentment
and indictment of a grand jury. ,,66 If probable cause was the only barrier to
amendment, it would appear that a judicial determination would have sufficed,
but the Court obviously believed in the "full sense of [the Fifth Amendment's]
necessity and of its value.
67
The Court later recognized that mere technical errors should not render an
indictment defective. 6' Nevertheless, in Smith v. United States,69 the Court warned
that the "substantial safeguards to those charged with serious crimes cannot be
eradicated under the guise of technical departures from the rules.",71 In United
States v. Stirone,71 the Court reaffirmed the Bain ruling by holding that a variation
between the indictment and proof at trial "destroyed the defendant's substantial
right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand
jury."' 72 The Court added that "[d]eprivation of such a basic right is far too
serious to be treated as nothing more than a variance and then dismissed as
harmless error." 73 As recently as 1992 the Supreme Court affirmed the impor-
tance of the traditional grand jury functions by holding that the Fifth Amend-
ment does not "permit judicial reshaping of the grand jury institution,
substantially altering the traditional relationships between the prosecutor, the
constituting court, and the grand jury itself."74
65. Bain, 121 U.S. at 13.
66. Id at 12 (quoting Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (1 Gray) 329, 344 (1857)).
67. Id
68. E.g., United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953); Williams v. United States, 341
U.S. 97, 104 (1951); Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 433 (1932).
69. 360 U.S. 1 (1959).
70. Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9 (1959).
71. 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
72. United States v. Stirone, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960).
73. Id The holding that an indictment error cannot be dismissed as harmless error is
questionable after Cotton. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 632-33 (addressing but not deciding whether an
indictment error is structural because the claim was not raised at trial and, therefore, was subject to
plain error analysis). Regardless, the issue may be analyzed differently in the capital context because
a capital defendant may not waive his Fifth Amendment right. FED. RULE CRIM. P. 7 (b); Smith
v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 6 (1959).
74. United States v. Wdliams, 504 U.S. 36, 50 (1992). Wilihams involved a federal court's
power to require exculpatory evidence to be presented to the grand jury. Id at 52. A requirement
that the grand jury be informed of the capital consequences of aggravating factors is not a judicial
reshaping of the grand jury institution. On the contrary, such a requirement is aligned with the
traditional function of the grand jury.
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Unfortunately, the increasingly complicated criminal codes and sentencing
schemes have weakened the role of this venerable institution.7" There is little
doubt that the Shaftesbury grand jurors knew the consequences of their
actions.76 For that matter, the grand juries formed under the Assize of
Clarendon were well aware that a trial by ordeal was rarely survived. During the
Revolutionary period, most felonies were capital offenses.7 8 A defendant could
expect to be sentenced to death for treason, murder, manslaughter, rape,
robbery, burglary, and arson.79 In many colonies, even seemingly minor crimes
could result in death sentences. For instance, in Virginia it was a capital offense
to receive a stolen horse.' ° In Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York
blasphemy was a capital crime."' Shortly after ratification of the Constitution,
Congress passed its first murder statute providing simply for the sentence of
death to any person who committed willful murder within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States.8 2 Furthermore, most grand jurors were well-
educated and well-informed citizens of the community and, as such, were
familiar with the relatively narrow range of sentences that could be imposed
upon a defendant found guilty of a particular crime. 3 In fact, the early practice
of "hanging day," when convicted felons were hanged before thousands of
onlookers, forcefully warned all citizens of the consequences of certain felonious
acts.' Considering these facts, there is no doubt that the grand jury contem-
75. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 202 F.3d 181, 182 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2000) (describing the
modern federal sentencing guidelines as an "Internal Revenue Code-like network of enhancements
and adjustments").
76. See Simmons, supra note 28, at 9-10 (describing how the immediately preceding indict-
ment against Colledge led to a quick public execution).
77. See FRANKEL & NAFTALIS, supra note 24, at 7-8 (describing how an indictment was
tantamount to conviction and often death).
78. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,247-48 (1949) ("This whole country has traveled
far from the period in which the death sentence was an automatic and commonplace result of
convictions-even for offenses today deemed trivial.'); see aLro Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 289 (1976) ("At the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791, the States
uniformly followed the common-law practice of making death the exclusive and mandatory
sentence for certain specified offenses."). For a more elaborate discussion of early punishment
theory see generally RONALDJ. PESTRITrO, FOUNDING THE CRIMINAL LAw (2000).
79. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 5 (2002).
80. Id. at 8.
81. Id at 6.
82. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, § 3,1 Stat.
112,113 (1790).
83. SeeJ UNE BARBARA KREsS, RISE TO THE CHALLENGE. FEDERAL GRANDJ URY REPRES-
SION, RESISTENCE, AND REFORM. 1970-1973, at 72 (1978) (describing the colonial grand jurors as
the most "financially secure and influential people of that period").
84. For a detailed description of the popularity of "hanging day" and the elaborate ceremo-
nial practices accompanying the events see BANNER, supra note 79, at 24-52.
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plated byJohn Hancock andJames Madison was an informed grand jury. Grand
jurors undeniably knew and were able to consider the possible punishment when
they voted on whether to indict."5 The grand jury is presently incapable of
making those judgments.'
III. Modern Death Penalty Doctrine
To appreciate the full potential of the grand jury's role in the post-Ring
environment, an understanding of the development of the Supreme Court's
modem death penalty doctrine is necessary. In 1972 the Court in Furman v.
Georgdi7 effectively declared then-existing death penalty schemes uncon-
stitutional.8" In the wake of that decision, state legislatures scrambled to adopt
new death penalty statutes to remedy the "arbitrary and capricious" manner in
which the death penalty had been imposed.8 9 Unfortunately, because five
separate and in some ways conflicting concurring opinions accompanied the per
curiam Furman decision, the Court provided legislatures with little guidance for
this task.9" The Court's 1975 Term exacerbated the problem when the Court
addressed a set of very distinct capital schemes. 91 These opinions simply
concluded that the death penalty was not per se unconstitutional;92 that a state
must establish standards to guide the sentencer's discretion;93 and that a sent-
encer must be allowed to consider mitigating evidence in order to determine that
"death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case."'94 As a result of the
Court's vagueness, the docket was inundated with death penalty challenges over
the next ten years.95 By 1987, however, the Court settled on two major
thresholds that a state's death penalty system must pass to survive Eighth
Amendment challenges: (1) a state must narrow the circumstances in which the
85. See text accompanying notes 75-84 (describing how grand jurors were educated and
informed about punishment).
86. See Respondent's January 17,2004 Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 32:00 (stating that the
grand jurors are unaware and told to ignore the possible punishment).
87. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
88. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
89. John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment andthe Substantive CtiminalLaw: The
Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 226-27, 238-41 (1986).
90. Bryan A. Stevenson, Two Views on the Impact of Ring v. Arizona on Capital Sentenang: The
Ultimate Authony on the Ultimate Punishment. The Requisite Role of theJuy in Capital Sentenang, 54 ALA.
L. REv. 1091, 1091 (2003).
91. Id. at 1092.
92. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176-87 (1976).
93. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270-74 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251-53
(1976); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-98.
94. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 326, 333-34 (1976).




death penalty can be imposed; and (2) the sentencer must make an individualized
determination of the appropriateness of the death penalty in each case.96
Naturally, these twin goals, often described simply as consistency and
individualization, tend to conflict.97 A purely individualized death penalty
scheme grants unfettered discretion to the jury.9" Conversely, to apply the death
penalty in a fully consistent manner, it would be necessary to automatically
impose the death penalty for certain categories of offenses without considering
the particularities of the offense and the character of the accused.9 The diff-
iculty in balancing the two standards eventually led two justices to abandon the
doctrine. " Justice Scalia, in Walton v. Arizona,0' declared that "[s]ince I cannot
possibly be guided by what seem to me incompatible principles, I must reject
[individualization as] plainly in error."'"2 Four years later, Justice Blackmun
expressed his agreement with Justice Scalia's determination that the goals of
consistency and individualization could never be reconciled. 10 3 However, he
drew a different conclusion. After twenty-two years on the Supreme Court
bench, in which he consistently voted to uphold the constitutionality of the
death penalty,Justice Blackmun concluded that "It]he death penalty experiment
has failed."'"
The issue of the petit jury's involvement in sentencing is related to the
tension between consistency and individualization. Of the five capital cases to
come before the Court in the 1975 Term, only one directly dealt with this
96. McClesky, 481 U.S. at 305-06 (1987); see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting cruel and
unusual punishment).
97. See, e.g., Steven Semeraro, Responsibilioy in Capital Sentencing, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79,
94-95 (2002) (describing the twin goals as consistency and individualization).
98. This is precisely what led the Supreme Court to declare Georgia's death penalty scheme
unconstitutional in Furman. Furman, 408 U.S. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id at 309-10
(Stewart, J., concurring); id at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
99. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293-99 (describing the inadequacies of mandatory death
sentences). For a more thorough discussion of the conflicting death penalty thresholds see generally
Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Recondkng Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital
Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147 (1991).
100. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 673 (1990) (Scalia,J., concurring in part) (abandon-
ing individualization); Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144-45 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(abandoning the doctrine as a whole).
101. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
102. Walton, 497 U.S. at 673 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
103. Calins, 510 U.S. at 1144-45 (1992) (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
104. Id at 1145.
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issue. 5 In Proffittv. Florida,°6 the Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment poses
no bar to a judicial determination of the ultimate sentence in capital cases. 0 7 The
rationale, although stated in a plurality opinion, rests on the assumption that a
judge is in no worse a position than the jury to make the ultimate sentencing
determination and, further, that a judicial determination could lead to greater
consistency in sentencing determinations." 8 The opinion did, however, ack-
nowledge that jury sentencing provides an "important societal function."" The
Court did not clarify exactly what that function entails but rather cited to a
footnote in Witherspoon v. Illinois"' in which the Court stated that a capital
sentencing jury provides an important "link between contemporary community
values and the penal system-a link without which the determination of
punishment could hardly reflect 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.' """ Ironically, that very footnote could be seen
as implying that jury sentencing is constitutionally required under the Eighth
Amendment, but that conclusion was not drawn by those joining the plurality
opinion." 2 Nevertheless, a majority of the Court has subsequently adopted the
Proffitt rationale." 3
Ring, however, calls into question the continuing validity of these
decisions." 4 The Court did not go so far as to require a jury determination of
punishment."' Quite to the contrary, the Court emphasized that the case merely
concerned the application ofAppren" to Arizona's capital sentencing scheme." 6
However, Arizona's leading argument in support of judicial determinations of
aggravating facts mirrored Justice Powell's rationale in Proffitt for rejecting the
105. See Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252 (plurality opinion) (stating that the fundamental difference
between the statute at issue in Gregg and the one before the Court was that, in Florida, a judge
determined the sentence).
106. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
107. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
111. Prffit, 428 U.S. at 252 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)).
112. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (declaring that the
definition of cruel and unusual punishment is determined by what society accepts as reasonable).
113. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462-63 (1984) (stating that "the death penalty is
not frustrated by, or inconsistent with, a scheme in which the imposition of the penalty in individual
cases is determined by a judge"); see also Walton, 497 U.S. at 647 (stating that the Court has soundly
rejected any notion that the Constitution requires a jury to determine punishment).
114. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (overruling Walton to the extent that it allows a judge to
determine the existence of aggravating factors).
115. See id. (requiring the jury to find facts upon which a sentence is enhanced but not a jury
determination).
116. Id. at 597 n.4.
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Eighth Amendment challenge to judge sentencing."7 Writing for the Ring
majority, Justice Ginsburg rejected Arizona's position that judicially determined
aggravating factors are a necessary procedure for consistent application of the
death penalty."' She added that the" 'founders of the American Republic were
not prepared to leave [criminal justice] to the State' " and although a jury trial
may not be the most efficient criminal process," '[the petit jury] has always been
free.' "119
This language may not signify a paradigmatic shift in death penalty
jurisprudence. " It does, however, affirm that the historic freedom the petit jury
retains in finding facts, as an embodiment of the community's conscience rather
than the government's desire, is fundamental to the Constitution.'12  Further-
more, it suggests that a state may not invoke the Eighth Amendment goal of
consistency in capital sentencing to justify abrogation of the historic role of
community participation in the criminal process. 1' Even Justice Scalia, who
does not subscribe to the principle that individualized sentencing determinations
are constitutionally mandated, stated in his Ring concurrence that the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial is seriously eroded "by the repeated spectacle of
a man's going to his death because a judge found that an aggravating factor
existed."'" Justice Breyer's concurrence signifies the strongest departure from
the consistency prong. -4 In the same passage within which he acknowledged
that 92 counties account for 50% of imposed death penalties since Furman, he
also stated that requiring a jury determination of punishment would "assure that,
in a particular case, the community indeed believes application of the death
penalty is appropriate, not 'cruel,' 'unusual,' or otherwise unwarranted.'
' 25
Ring suggests that the Court has shifted its emphasis somewhat from
Furman-era doctrine. The Court now appears more willing to entertain
challenges to the death penalty process that are posited as violations of con-
stitutional rights other than the Eighth Amendment. 26 The question remains
117. Id at 607; Proffilt, 428 U.S. at 252.
118. Ring, 536 U.S. at 607.
119. Id. (quoting Apprnd, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
120. But see Stevenson, smpra note 90, at 111 (stating that Justice Ginsberg's language may
signify a shift "in the way in which the Court approaches the issue of jury involvement in capital
sentencing").
121. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 607 (describing the founders' emphasis on a free jury).
122. See id. (rejecting Arizona's consistency argument for judicial fact-finding).
123. Id at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring).
124. Id at 613-19 (Breyer, J., concurring).
125. Id at 618 (Breyer, J., concurring).
126. Seeid at 611 (ScaliaJ., concurring) (stating that the erroneous Walton outcome was due




whether analysis of rights such as the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee
differs in the death penalty context."i There is support for the proposition that
it does. 2 ' Regardless, the Court has yet to consider in anyfederal death penalty
case the constitutional right that guarantees a body of citizens best situated to
reflect the community's conscience- the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury
indictment.
129
IV. The Modem GrandJwy- Unifom' and Miscdiite
A. The Maie 067
When a federal grand jury is empaneled, it is not initially given specific
instructions relating to the alleged offense. "' Instead, the grand jury receives a
"charge" that briefly summarizes the history of the institution and details the
panel's responsibilities.' The relevant portion from the model charge rec-
ommended by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts advises:
You cannot judge the wisdom of the criminal laws enacted by
Congress, that is, whether or not there should or should not be a
federal law designating certain activities as criminal. That is to be
determined by Congress and not you.
Furthermore, when deciding whether or not to indict, you should not
be concerned about punishiment in the event of conviction. Judges
alone determine punishment. "2
This charge is a misstatement of federal law, at least insofar as death penalty
cases are concerned.' In federal capital cases, the judge does not determine
punishment.' The United States Code dictates that "the jury by unanimous
127. See Rir- 536 U.S. at 599 (analyzing the jury's historical role in capital trials, but not
determining whether Sixth Amendment analysis differs in that context).
128. In Wkdxpoon the Court reversed the capital conviction of the defendant as to punish-
ment, but not as to guilt. Waheuspom, 391 U.S. at 523. Holding that the penaltyviolated the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because jurors that expressed
reservations about the death penalywere excluded, the Court stated that "in this case the jurywas
entrusted with two distinct responsibilities: first, to determine whether the petitioner was innocent
or guilty, and second, if guilty, to determine whether his sentence should be imprisonment or
death." Id at 518.
129. In 2002 the Court did consider the failure of an indictment to list an aggravating fact in
a noncapital case. Cor, 535 U.S. at 634. The Court found, however, that the error had been
waived by a failure to object at trial, and did not warrant correction as "plain error." Id
130. BEALE ET AL, supra note 48, at 4-10.
131. Id
132. Id at 4-15.





vote... recommend[s] whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, to
life imprisonment without possibility of release or some other lesser sentence. ' 135
The judge may not impose a greater sentence than the jury recommends.
36
Furthermore, petit jurors are almost always instructed that they alone must
determine the sentence. 37 The additional requirement that all capital case juries
must be punishment qualified-no juror can serve in a capital case who cannot
consider both the death penalty and life imprisonment as possible punish-
ments-underscores the model charge's inaccuracy.
38
At first glance, the model charge's misstatement does not appear to affect
the indictment process. It can hardly matter to the individual grand jurors who
makes the ultimate determination. However, the model charge's clear de-
emphasis on the role of the community in the death penalty context directly
contrasts with the Supreme Court's recent affirmation of the petit jury's
responsibilities.'39 Essentially, capital grand jurors are told that the government
will determine whether or not the accused is sentenced to death. The
responsibility factor is thereby removed from their decision-making process.
The Supreme Court has made clear that responsibility is "indispensable to... the
Eighth Amendment's 'need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment.' ,'4 Although the Court was addressing the need for
responsible sentencing decisions, the importance of responsible judgments at
every stage of the capital process is of paramount importance. 4' The grand
jurors must not be led to believe that their role, and that of the community, is of
little importance in the greater judicial scheme.
The broader significance of the model charge is that it misstates the
constitutional function of the grand jury. Whether or not grand jurors have been
instructed "from time immemorial that punishment is not their concern," the
grand jury has operated as an independent body at least since Shaftesbury's era
135. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (2000).
136. See 18 U.S.C. § 3594 (2000) ("Upon a recommendation under section 3593(e) that the
defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without possibility of release, the
court shall sentence the defendant accordingly.").
137. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985) ("[W]e conclude that it is
constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who
has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's
death rests elsewhere.").
138. Seegeneral!y Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38,40-58 (1980) (describing the capital qualification
process in Texas as compared to other states). See also Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992)
(ruling that the defense must be allowed to strike a juror who would automatically vote for death).
139. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 608 (requiring a jury finding of aggravating facts); supra Part III
(describing how Ring inevitably alters the petit jury's role in sentencing).
140. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 330 (1985) (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305).
141. See Semeraro, supra note 97, at 83 (emphasizing the need for responsibility in "death-
enabling decisions at each step in the process from legislative drafting through appellate review").
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and, of course, at the time of ratification of the Fifth Amendment. 4 2 Implicit
in its independence is the "right" to refuse to indict. This "right" operates
regardless of a positive determination of probable cause. In VasqueZ v. Hilly,
43
the Supreme Court stated that:
[t]he Grand Jury does not determine only that probable cause exists
to believe that a defendant committed a crime, or that it does not. In
the hands of a grand jury lies the power to charge a greater offense or
a lesser offense; numerous counts or a single count; and perhaps the
most significant of all, a capital offense or a noncapital offense-all on
the basis of the same facts. Moreover, "the grand jury is not bound
to indict in every case where a conviction can be obtained."'"
This understanding of the grand jury's historic function has been echoed
in the lower courts. 4  In Gaither v. United States,"4 the court reasoned that
because "it has the power to indict even where a clear violation of the law is
shown, the grand jury can reflect the conscience of the community in providing
relief where strict application of the law would prove unduly harsh."'4 7 The
Northern District of Illinois, referring to the refusal of the Shaftesbury grand
jurors to indict in the face of extreme judicial pressure, stated that "[t]his
inherent right of the grand jury remains firmly imbedded in law."' 48 "Just as a
prosecutor can, in the exercise of discretion, decline prosecution in the first
instance, a grand jury can return a true bill or a no bill as they deem fit."' 49 When
the grand jury is told not to consider punishment or the wisdom of the laws, it
is commanded to surrender the power that the law has long vested in it. Thus,
the Fifth Amendment is emptied of much of its significance.
142. Respondent's January 17, 2004 Oral Argument in Allen, supra note 1, at 32:00; see supra
Part II (describing the historical independence of the grand jury).
143. 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
144. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) (quoting United States v. Ciambrone, 601
F.2d 616, 629 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., dissenting)).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp 939,942 (N.D. 111. 1979) (stating
that the grand jury can refuse to indict even with a finding of probable cause); Gaither v. United
States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (same).
146. 413 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
147. Gaither, 413 F.2d at 1066 n.6 (quoting 8JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 6.02(1) (Cipes ed. 1968)).
148. Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp. at 942.
149. Id.; see also In reJordon, 439 F. Supp. 199,204 n.5 (S.D.W.V. 1977) (recognizing the grand
jury's right to refuse an indictment by a "form of (grand) jury nullification"); United States v. Cox,
342 F.2d 167, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1965) (Wisdom, J., concurring) ("[The grand jury] has the equally
unchallengeable power to shield the guilty, should the whims of the jurors or their conscious or




Attacks on the sufficiency (or lack thereof) of the information placed before
the grand jury are relatively rare in the American justice system.' When the
question has been presented to the courts, judges have almost unanimously
rejected the claims.'' The issue of whether grand jurors had been erroneously
instructed on their duties, however, has only been decided by one federal
circuit. 1 2 In 2002 David Francis Marcucci challenged the constitutionality of the
model grand jury charge because it failed to "explain to the grand jurors that they
can refuse to indict even if they find probable cause."' 53 Relying on Vasquer,
Marcucci claimed that the Supreme Court's express recognition of the grand
jury's "nullification" ability required the court to inform grand jurors of that
power.'" The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed.155
It reasoned that because the relevant VasqueZ passage is dictum that merely
describes a historical practice, and that the language of the model charge, stating
that the grand jury shouldindict if it finds probable cause, there is "room-albeit
limited room-for a grand jury to reject an indictment."'
156
In 2004 the Ninth Circuit was again asked to consider the adequacy of the
model charge.'5" In United States v. Navarm-Vargas,ss the defendant challenged
that portion of the model charge instructing the grand jurors that they could not
consider the wisdom of the laws and should not consider punishment in
determining whether or not to indict.5 9 The court stated that it had already
examined and found the model charge constitutional and, therefore, affirmed the
conviction."6
Both cases drew spirited dissents. Dissenting in Marcucci, Judge Michael
Hawkins stressed the significance of the grand jury as an independent body.'
He recognized the important tradition of grand jury nullification' 62 He added
that regardless of the wisdom behind instructing the grand jurors on their right
150. See Wilams, 504 U.S. at 53-54 (describing the history of motions to quash indictments
based on the sufficiency of evidence placed before the grand jury).
151. Id
152. See United States v. Marcucci, 299 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002) (addressing the
constitutionality of the model grand jury charge); Navarro-Vaqas, 367 F.3d at 897 (same).
153. Marcmd, 299 F.3d at 1159.
154. Id at 1160.
155. Id at 1164.
156. Id.
157. Navarm-Vaigas, 367 F.3d at 897.
158. 367 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2004).
159. Navarro-Vagas, 367 F.3d at 897.
160. Id. at 898-99.




to "nullify" the indictment, the model charge clearly misled panel members.
6 3
He also contended that barring grand jurors from considering the wisdom of
enacted laws or punishment ran "afoul of traditional understandings of the grand
jury."'
1
Judge Alex Kozinski dissented in Navarro-Vargas.6 ' He stated that although
he believed Marcucci was wrongly decided for the reasons set forth by Judge
Hawkins, stare decisis bound him to reject the defendant's attack on the
propriety of instructing the grand jurors that they should not consider
punishment.166 However, on the issue of whether the grand jurors could be
affirmatively instructed not to consider the wisdom of the laws, he felt Marcucci
impelled the opposite conclusion.'67 The fact that the wisdom of the laws
instruction was stated in mandatory terms directly conflicted with the Marccucci
court's reasoning that the instruction left room for a grand jury to reject an
indictment. 168 Interestingly, the subtle differences in the model charge's language
misled the Navarro-Vargas majority, which framed the question presented as
whether the grand jury could be instructed that they "could not consider the
wisdom of criminal laws or punishment" when determining whether or not to
indict. 6
Obviously these cases present a hurdle for defendants challenging the
model charge in the Ninth Circuit. The fact that both decisions drew such
strong dissents, however, provides some reason for optimism that other circuits
may reach a different conclusion.' 0 Furthermore, the defendants in both cases
were not charged with capital offenses.'' As the Supreme Court has often
repeated, "the penalty of death is quantitatively different from a sentence of
imprisonment, however long.' 7 2 Regardless, empowering the grand jury with
the ability to refuse an indictment despite a finding of probable cause is only one
of the necessary steps in restoring the institution to its former vitality.
163. Id. at 1169.
164. Id.




169. Id. at 897 (emphasis added).
170. Marcucci, 299 F.3d at 1166-73 (Hawkins, J., dissenting); Navarro-Vaqaw, 367 F.3d at
899-903 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
171. See Marcucci, 299 F.3d at 1158 (appealing conviction for importing and possessing
marijuana); Navarro-Vargas, 367 F.3d at 897 (same).
172. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
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B. Informing the GrandJugy
VasqueZ noted that one of the most important functions of the grand jury
is the decision to charge "a capital offense or a noncapital offense." '73 If grand
jurors are unaware that statutory aggravating factors, and not the homicide
allegation itself, demarcate the line between life and death, the significance of
that function is seriously diminished. With Ring comes the opportunity to place
the grand jury's present inadequacies before the courts.
Ring undeniably enlarged citizen involvement in punishment deter-
minations.'74 Although the petit jury has always determined the existence of
aggravating factors under modem federal death penalty statutes, the Court has
now expressly stated that the Sixth Amendment requires this result.'75 Ring
declared that the Sixth Amendment guarantees that criminal justice cannot be
wholly left to government officials.'76 It follows, then, that the Supreme Court
will no longer passively extol the community's involvement in factual
determinations without actively ensuring its right to do so. Furthermore, Ring's
Sixth Amendment analysis signals that the Court may be more willing to
undertake this task when the questioned procedure erodes a specific
constitutional right, rather than when it is challenged as cruel and unusual
punishment.77
Ring's significance to the Fifth Amendment Indictment Clause is readily
apparent. The Supreme Court has stated that "[tihe grand and petit juries...
form a 'strong and two-fold barrier.., between the liberties of the people and
the prerogative of the [government].' ,,178 If a grand jury is denied the
opportunity to determine whether an individual defendant should face a capital
charge, the powerful effect of that first "barrier" is greatly diminished.
The founders of our nation regarded the grand jury as a vital institution for
reflecting the beliefs and values of the local community.'79 The institution's
undeniable independence permits the grand jury to operate without any
173. Vazgue!, 474 U.S. at 263; see also Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 399 (1998) ("It
controls not only the initial decision to indict, but also significant decisions such as how many
counts to charge and whether to charge a greater or lesser offense, including the important decision
to charge a capital crime.").
174. See Stevenson, supra note 90, at I111-37 (analyzing Rings sweeping implications on jury
sentencing).
175. Ring, 536 U.S. at 608.
176. Id. at 607.
177. See supra Part III (analyzing the shift in death penalty procedure analysis from the Eighth
Amendment to specifically delineated rights).
178. United States v. Harris, 536 U.S. 545,564 (2000) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 151 (1968)).
179. See spra Part II (describing the events that led to the inclusion of the grand jury right as
part of the Fifth Amendment).
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government interference."8 Unlike even the petit jury, it is not subject to the
tactical gerrymandering of peremptory challenges or voir dire examination and
thus generally represents a broader cross-section of ideals and values within a
particular locality.' 8' In this way, the grand jury is even better situated than the
petit jury to fulfill its role as the "conscience of the community."' 82 As the
Supreme Court stated in Woodv. Georgia,.8 " fhe 'ancestors of our 'grand jurors'
are from the first neither exactly accusers, nor exactly witnesses; they are to give
voice to common repute.' "' If Ring does, in fact, signal that the community's
moral input into factual determinations at the sentencing phase is guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment, the courts must allow the community a similar
opportunity in the charging phase."5 Specifically, consistent with the functioning
of the grand jury at the time of this nation's founding, the Constitution requires
the courts to provide the grand jurors with the ability to reflect the community's
values in determining whether or not a capital trial is appropriate for each
particular case."'
Ring's insistence that the goal of consistency must not detract from Sixth
Amendment protections holds equally true in the Fifth Amendment context.
The government cannot guard against arbitrary decision-making by withholding
information from the grand jury. That is not to say that the grand jury must be
informed of exculpatory information or mitigating factors. 87 A court simply
must provide the grand jurors with adequate information to enable the grand
jury to determine whether the prosecutor's evidence of aggravating facts
warrants a capital charge.
180. See Williams, 504 U.S. at 47 (concluding that the grand jury's independence derives in part
from the fact that it is not provided for in the body of the Constitution and therefore remains
separated from any branch of the federal government).
181. See BLANCHE DAVIS BLANK, THE NOT So GRAND JURY 9-19 (1993) (describing the
federal grand jury selection process through individual experience and in the federal system as a
whole).
182. Gaither, 413 F.2d at 1066.
183. 370 U.S. 375 (1966).
184. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1966) (quoting POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY
OF THE ENGLISH LAW 642 (2d ed. 1909)).
185. See supra Part III (arguing that the Sixth Amendment may guarantee that the community's
moral sensibilities be reflected in a jury determination under Ring). Regardless, because the jury is
now required to find aggravating facts before a sentence of death is imposed, Ring effectually
guarantees this result in the punishment phase. Ring, 536 U.S. at 608.
186. See supra Part II (describing the historical function of the grand jury).
187. See Villiams, 504 U.S. at 54 (stating that challenging an indictment based upon inadequate
evidence before a grand jury "run[s] counter to the whole history of the grand jury institution"
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The proposition that a grand jury must be informed of the law
is quite unlike challenging the prosecutor's evidence before a grand jury. Unlike the latter situation,
an informed grand jury is completely consistent with its functional history. See supra Part II
(describing how the colonial grand juries were well-informed).
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Whether or not the Court eventually adopts Justice Scalia's position that
individualization is an unnecessary goal, Ring guarantees that the individual
circumstances of each case will be reflected in the verdict.' A capital offense
is unlike any other. 9 The death penalty is part and parcel to every determination
made during the sentencing proceeding."9 The petit jury certainly considers the
effect of its factual determinations on the sentencing decision and votes
accordingly. 9 ' If the grand jury is to remain the first tier of protection between
the government and the accused, it must be able to protect a person from
standing trial for his life when the facts do not warrant it. Implicit in the
determination of facts, such as whether the crime was committed in a "especially
heinous, cruel, or depraved manner" or that "the victim was particularly
vulnerable," is the determination that the death penalty would be at least
potentially justified. 19 2 If grand jurors are ignorant of the consequences of their
actions, the Indictment Clause of the Fifth Amendment is effectively
incapacitated. Justice Scalia feared that failing to apply the Apprend doctrine to
the death penalty eligibility factors in Ring would lead to the petit jury's "perilous
decline."' 9 3 Under current practice, the grand jury has largely met that fate.9
"We cannot preserve our veneration for the protection... in criminal cases if we
render ourselves callous to the need for that protection by regularly imposing the
death penalty without it."'95
188. See supra Part III (describing how Ring, regardless of whether the judge determines the
ultimate sentence, affects the jury sentencing process); see also Sundby, supra note 99, 1170-71
(describing how individualization inevitably enters the death penalty process through jury determi-
nations with or without constitutionally mandated mitigating factors); c. Adams, 448 U.S. at 50
(stating that jurors cannot be excluded if they state that they will honestly determine the existence
of facts even if they concede that "the prospects of the death penalty may affect what their honest
judgment of the facts will be or what they may deem to be a reasonable doubt").
189. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (stating that "[t]he penalty of death is qualitatively different
from a sentence of imprisonment, however long").
190. See Sundby, supra note 99, 1170-71 (describing the role of jury nullification in the death
penalty context).
191. Id
192. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) (2004) (listing the aggravating factors for homicide); see alsoAlkn,
357 F.3d at 757-58 (citing State v. Finch, 975 P.2d 967, 1007-08 (Wash. 1999)) (determining that
a petit jury's determination of aggravating facts does not compel the conclusion that the grand jury
would have found those same facts because capital aggravators are "relatively qualitative determina-
tions").
193. Ring, 536 U.S. at 612 (Scalia,J., concurring).
194. See Respondent's January 17, 2004 Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 32:00 (stating that the




V. The Collateral Effect on the Charging Process
A. Racial Dispariy
Beyond the constitutional requirement of an informed grand jury,
reinvigoration of the grand jury may ameliorate some problems affecting the
death penalty process. One of the most persistent issues in the continuing death
penalty debate is that of racial disparity.'96 Statistics show an alarming gap
between white and minority defendants in charging and sentencing. 197 As of
2004 seventy-five percent of those approved for federal capital prosecution since
the federal death penalty was reinstated in 1988 have been members of minority
groups. 9 ' Seventy-three percent of defendants placed on the federal death row
have been minorities.' 9 Under Attorney General Ashcroft's tenure, minority
defendants accused of murdering white victims were more likely to be targeted
for capital prosecution than are minority defendants accused of killing other
minority victims.'
In McCleskey v. Kemp, 2°' the Supreme Court addressed the issue of racial
disparity in the state of Georgia. 2 2 The defendant presented statistical evidence
that showed, accounting for other relevant variables, that a defendant charged
with killing a white victim was 4.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty
than a defendant charged with the murder of a black victim. 3 The Court first
addressed McCleskey's claim that the Georgia sentencing procedure violated the
Equal Protection Clause.' Because McCleskey could not show a purposeful
intent to discriminate or that discrimination adversely affected his own case, the
challenge failed.2 5 The Court noted that statistics can provide the necessary
proof of discriminatory intent, but because McClesky's statewide data reflected
196. See Scott W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutralty in Capital Selection and the Eighth
AmendmentAgumentforAboltion Based on Unconsdous RacialDiscrimination, 45 WM. AND MARYL. REV.
2083, 2085 (2004) (stating that the capital sentencing reform movement is due mostly to concerns
about racial discrimination).
197. See generally NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND/CRIM. JUSTICE
PROJECT,DEATH Row U.S.A. 1, athttp://www.deathpenalyinfo.org/DRUSA-20040401.pdf (last
visited October 27, 2004) (compiling all current racial statistics regarding the death penalty).
198. Kevin McNally, Race and the Federal Death Penalty: A Nonexistent Problem Gets Worse, 53
DEPAUL L. REv. 1615, 1617 (2004).
199. Id
200. Id. at 1626.
201. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
202. McClesky,, 481 U.S. at 282-83.
203. Id at 287. The statistical evidence came from the Baldus study, created by Professors
David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth, and examined statistics gathered from
over 2,000 murder cases in Georgia during the 1970's. Id at 286. The authors accounted for 230
non-racial variables that may have otherwise explained any disparities. Id at 287.
204. Id at 291.
205. Id at 297.
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decisions by numerous properly selected juries, the evidence did not show that
McCleskey's own jury acted with improper intent. 0 6 McCleskey's claim that his
statistical evidence proved that the death penalty was imposed in violation of the
Eighth Amendment also failed." 7 Georgia's sentencing scheme provided for an
individualized determination in each case and narrowed the class of defendants
subject to the death penalty." 8 The Court held that the Georgia scheme met the
twin requirements of consistency and individualization and, therefore, did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.2°9
Significantly, the McCleskey Court did not question the validity of
McCleskey's conclusions. 2 0 Nor, as the current federal statistics show, is there
any reason for confidence that racial disparity does not continue to affect the
application of the death penalty in the United States. 211 The McCleskey Court
simply could not find a solution without being forced to vacate the death penalty
in every particular case.212 Unfortunately, the fact remains that race plays a role
in the capital process2 . 3
The informed grand jury may be able to play a positive role in addressing
this issue. Grand jury members, just as petit jurors, are subject to their own
personal passions and prejudices. 214 However, as previously mentioned, the
grand jury usually represents a broader cross-section of the community.215 The
jurors may not be struck for any reason.
216 They are not punishment qualified.
217
Furthermore, no one can disagree that one of the grand jury's most important
functions is to protect against prosecutorial prejudice and overreaching.
218
206. Id. at 294.
207. Id. at 313.
208. McCleskqy, 481 U.S. at 308.
209. Id.
210. See id. at 315 (stating that the Baldus study could implicate the entire criminal system in
the United States). The Court did seem to acknowledge that McCleskey's claims were significant
but determined that they were better suited as arguments for legislative reform. Id at 319.
211. McNally, supra note 198, at 1645.
212. See McCeskey, 481 U.S. at 313-16 (arguing that virtually any defendant could achieve a
reversal of their conviction if the Court found the racial disparity statistics constituted a valid Eighth
Amendment claim).
213. See McNally, supra note 198, at 1645 (statistically showing that race affects the federal
death penalty).
214. SeeBLANK, supranote 181, at 9-19 (describing how personal prejudices affect the federal
grand jury).
215. See id (describing the selection process through individual experience and in the federal
system as a whole).
216. Id. Grand jurors may, subject to the presiding court's judgment, be excused for personal
reasons. Id
217. Id.
218. See generally Vasqueq, 474 U.S. at 263-64 (stating that a grand jury system from which
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Grand juries aware of the consequences of their decisions are more likely to take
responsibility for their actions.219 Placing a second body, or third if one accounts
for the prosecutor, as a restriction against a racially biased sentence of death, is
a protection worth having. This protection can only be realized if the jury is
adequately informed of its capital charging power.
B. Restoring the Local Influence on the Federal Death Penaly
Another important issue affecting the federal death penalty is the so-called
federalism debate.' ° On January 27, 1995, the United States Department of
Justice ordered that all federal prosecutors submit to the Attorney General's
Review Committee on Capital Cases ("Review Committee") all cases in which
a defendant is charged with a capital-eligible offense for a determination as to
whether the death penalty will be sought.21 Under the death penalty protocol,
as it is commonly known, U.S. attorneys must submit their cases regardless of
whether they wish to seek the death penalty. -2 Under this system, Attorney
General Janet Reno overruled federal prosecutors' decisions to seek life
sentences twenty-six times during her tenure.' During the tenure of Attorney
General John Ashcroft, the numbers rose substantially. ' As of August 6, 2004,
Attorney General Ashcroft overruled federal prosecutors' recommendations to
forgo the death penalty forty-one times.25 In addition, Attorney Genral
Ashcroft insisted on reviewing-and in some instances rejecting-all plea
agreements by which local federal prosecutors had proposed to avoid a capital
trial by accepting a defendant's guilty plea in exchange for a life sentence. -26 The
blacks have been systematically excluded fatally affects the charging process).
219. See Semararo, supra note 97,97-98 (describing how a sense of responsibility leads to more
"reflective, carefully considered decisions").
220. See general4yJohn Gleeson, Supervising Federal Capital Punishment. Wy the Attorney General
Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against the Death Penal y, 89 VA. L. REV. 1697,1714-17
(2003) (describing how nationally consistent charging decisions encroach on a particular locality's
views on the death penalty).
221. U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: A STATISTICAL
SURVEY (1998-2000) 1-2 (2000), at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/dpsurvey.htfnl; see also
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, % 9-10.010 - 10.120 (2001) (describing the death penalty
review process), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia.reading-room/usam.
222. UNITED STATES ATFORNEY's MANUAL: CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 70 (2004),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-readingroom/usar/title9/crmOOO7.htm
[herinafter CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL].
223. Gleeson, supra note 220, at 1697.
224. Id
225. Julia Preston, Killers Get Life Sentences, In Setback to Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES, August 6,
2004, at B1.
226. Gleeson, supra note 220, at 1697 n.2; see also CRIMINAL RESoURCE MANUAL, supra note
222, at § 70 (requiring the protocol process for plea agreements that preclude imposition of the
death penalty).
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stated rationale behind the death penalty protocol is to achieve national
uniformity in capital charging decisions.-" In particular, the protocol seeks to
ensure against racial considerations factoring into the capital charging process.2
None of the members of the Review Committee, nor the Attorney General, are
ever directly informed of a defendant's race. 29
The idea of national uniformity in prosecutorial decision-making is
consistent with the Supreme Court's goal of consistency.2 0 However, as the
statistics show, the protocol may not have achieved its desired effect.
231
Furthermore, such centralized decision-making can conflict with any particular
jurisdiction's prevailing views on the death penalty.23 2 An informed grand jury
will strike the necessary balance between the centralized federal policy and a
particular locality's concerns. 233 The petit jury, although able to reflect the
community's moral beliefs on the ultimate punishment decision, does nothing
to prevent a defendant from standing trial for his life in a jurisdiction that does
not otherwise generally condone the death penalty.24 Although not specifically
included in the language of the Fifth Amendment, the use of the grand jury in
this context is analogous to the vicinage right included in the Sixth
Amendment." s By assuring an in-state venue for criminal trials, the framers of
our Constitution intended that the criminal process be governed mostly by local
rather than national standards. 236 Judge Alex Kozinski's Navarro-Vargas dissent
227. Gleeson, spra note 220, at 1698-99.
228. Id at 1699.
229. U.S. DEP'T OFJUTICE, supra note 221, at 3.
230. See supra Part III (describing the Supreme Court's modem death penalty doctrine).
231. See McNally, supra note 198, at 1617 (describing the apparent racial disparity on the
federal death row).
232. See Gleeson, supra note 220, at 1716 (describing how the death penalty protocol conflicts
with local concerns).
In a federal system that rightly accords great deference to states' prerogatives, the
federalization of the death penalty should be limited to cases in which there is a
heightened and demonstrable federal interest, one that justifies the imposition of a
capital prosecution on communities that refuse to permit them in their own courts.
Id.
233. Judge Gleeson provides a scathing critique of the justice Department's implementation
of its death penalty protocol in his article. See generally id at 1722-28 (discussing the protocol's
adverse impact on criminal investigations). Many of his concerns may not be wholly addressed by
the implementation of an informed grand jury.
234. See id at 1717 (describing how a federal prosecutor's charging decisions are inevitably
controlled by the ease in which he could convince a jury to convict on a capital charge).
235. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed.. .
236. Seegenerall Michael C. Dorf, The Misguided Uniformity in CapitalPunishment Why It Conflicts
With Constitutional Jug Trial Rights, Findlaw.com (Feb. 19, 2003) (arguing that the death penalty
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
aptly summarizes this point: "An independent grand jury-one that interposes
the local community's values on prosecutorial decisions that are controlled by
policies set in Washington as to the enforcement of laws passed in
Washington-seems like an important safeguard that is entirely consistent with
the grand jury's traditional function." 237
1/7 Application to State Grand Juries
Charging methods greatly differ among the various states. 238 In those states
that do require a grand jury indictment for capital offenses, the informed grand
jury problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Supreme Court has not ruled on
the applicability of Ring to state charging procedures. 239 It appears doubtful that
the Court will. The right to a grand jury indictment has not been incorporated
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2' The absence of
aggravating factors in the charging document may raise notice guarantee
problems."4 However, at least one state has ruled that notice can be and is
provided by other methods such as a bill of particulars.242 Although other forms
of notice may not always provide the defendant with the exact aggravating
factors that the prosecution will rely on, it appears that as a practical matter, the
absence of aggravators in an indictment does not violate the Due Process Clause
in most instances.243
In states that do provide for a grand jury indictment, capital defense
attorneys should focus their attention on the state's grand jury guarantee. In
most instances, the right to an indictment has been included in the state
constitution or has been a statutory "right" since the state was formed.2 ' In
protocol is impliedly unconstitutional) at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20030219.html.
237. Navarm-Vagas, 367 F.3d at 902 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
238. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 8 (requiring a grand jury indictment for all felony cases but
allowing the legislature to abolish the use of a grand jury indictment for misdemeanors); ALASKA
CONST. art. I, § 8 (requiring a grand jury indictment for all infamous crimes unless waived); ARIZ.
CONST. art. II, § 30 (allowing the use of indictment or information for prosecution of all crimes);
ARK CONST. amend. XXI, § 1 (abolishing the grand jury indictment requirement).
239. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4 (stating that the defendant did not contend that his indict-
ment was constitutionally defective and noting that the Fifth Amendment is not incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment).
240. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538.
241. See Cole, 333 U.S. at 201 (stating that notice of the particular charge is one of the clearest
established principles of due process).
242. Primeaux v. State, 88 P.3d 893, 899-900 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004). Oklahoma charged
Primeaux by information, rather than indictment. Id However, the court's reasoning appears to
apply regardless of the charging method. Id.
243. Id
244. See supra Part II (describing how every state in the post-revolutionary period enacted laws
guaranteeing the right to a grand jury indictment).
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State v. Fortin,245 the Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed the issue of
whether, under the New Jersey Constitution, aggravating factors must be
submitted to the grand jury.2' The court acknowledged that a defendant in New
Jersey is given adequate notice of the aggravators at a separate hearing.
247
Nevertheless, the court found that "those assurances of notice and a well-
founded prosecution are not adequate substitutes for the [New Jersey]
constitutional right of a grand jury presentation if aggravating factors are
elements of the crime of capital murder."2' Finding that capital aggravators are
indeed elements under Ring and Apprendi, the court declared a prospective rule
that aggravating facts must be included in an indictment.249 Regardless of
whether a state's right to indictment is characterized as a statutory or
constitutional right, the New Jersey Supreme Court's analysis appears to apply
to many states.25 ° Once a state has established that its own law requires
aggravating factors to be submitted to the grand jury, this article's analysis of the
right to an informed grand jury in the federal context applies at the state level.231
VII. Conclusion
The grand jury is perhaps one of our most important and least understood
institutions. Historically veiled in secrecy and independent from any other
branch of government, the "people's panel" provides invaluable protection to
the community and the individual citizen. It gives a voice to the ideals and
morality of the local community as against a centralized national political process.
However, the grand jury's effective power has been severely limited. Federal
grand jurors no longer understand the consequences of their actions, and, in fact,
are ordered to ignore anything but the facts of the particular case. Thus, the
grand jury has tended to become nothing more than a "rubber stamp" for the
prosecution.
The Supreme Court's decision in Ring to require submission of statutory
aggravating factors to the petit jury presents an opportunity to restore the grand
jury to its once-prominent position. An informed grand jury, fully aware that
aggravating facts demarcate the line between life and death, has the opportunity
245. 843 A.2d 974 (N.J. 2004).
246. State v. Fortin, 843 A.2d 974, 1027-28 (N.J. 2004).
247. Id. at 1030.
248. Id.
249. Id at 1035-36.
250. Id at 1035 (stating that the state constitutional right to an indictment has no less force
than its federal counterpart).
251. It should be noted that the pertinent language of the model grand jury charge, although
promulgated for use in federal courts, is likely substantially similar to state charges. See BEALE ET
AL., supra note 48, at 4-15 (providing the model grand jury charge for use in all grand jury proceed-
ings).
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to speak, once again, as the moral voice of the community. The grand jury, as
envisioned by the founders of our Nation, was an institution informed of the
applicable law. It knew the consequences of its actions and was thus able to
provide protection and moderation where an otherwise strict application of the
law would be too harsh.
The Supreme Court has signaled that it may be willing to review death
penalty procedures in a new light. When claims are presented as a violation of
a specific delineated right, the Court may be more likely to deem specific grand
jury procedures unconstitutional. As it stands, the grand jury cannot provide its
constitutionally mandated function of standing between the accuser and the
accused. It simply doesn't have the necessary tools. The death penalty is the
most severe punishment that society can impose on an individual. More than
any other punishment, the nature of the death penalty commands that the
Constitution's basic protections cannot be sacrificed in the interest of con-
venience or efficiency. It is only proper that no individual should have to defend
his life unless a grand jury has first determined that he should.
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